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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-3050

MONIQUE BAKER, n/k/a
MONIQUE KATCHMER,
Appellant
v.
OFFICE DEPOT, INC.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-02229
District Judge: The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 30, 2004

Before: ROTH, BARRY, and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: November 8, 2004)

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
This case turns on the timeliness of an employment discrimination claim brought
by appellant Monique Baker, now known as Monique Katchmer, on the basis of sexual

harassment and gender discrimination. The District Court granted appellee Office
Depot’s motion for summary judgment. We will affirm.
I.
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, and so we limit our discussion
to those necessary for the resolution of this appeal. From July 2000 to March 2001,
Office Depot employed Baker as a cross-dock operator. Baker alleges that in the months
leading up to March 2001, a co-worker, John Alto, sexually harassed her. She also
alleges that she repeatedly complained to management at Office Depot, to no avail.
Ultimately, Office Depot terminated her employment on March 16, 2001 due to a claimed
reduction in its work force. Alto was not terminated.
Immediately after her termination, Baker retained counsel, who “notified” the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (“PHRC”) of Baker’s claim. In response, a
letter was sent by the PHRC on March 19, 2001 that apparently enclosed forms and gave
instructions on how to file a complaint. Counsel prepared a complaint, but did not file it.
Counsel did file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on January 16, 2002—306 days after the date of Baker’s termination.1 The
EEOC dismissed the complaint because it was not timely filed and advised Baker that she

1

Baker’s counsel concedes that he filed her EEOC claim on January 16, 2002. The
District Court calculated that the last date Baker could have filed with the EEOC was
January 10, 2002 – 300 days after the March 16, 2001 date of termination. We agree.
Therefore, the claim was filed six days late.
2

had ninety days to file an action in federal court. On December 6, 2002, Baker timely
filed this action seeking recovery under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, with the § 1981 claim subsequently
withdrawn. Office Depot filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for
summary judgment. As noted above, the District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Office Depot. 2
II.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we
apply the same standard the District Court was required to apply. Stratton v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 363 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 2004). That standard is well-established:
[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of
material fact presented and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, we
resolve all factual doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.
Conshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Under Title VII, before a claimant may bring suit in federal court, she must
exhaust her administrative remedies. See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020-21
(3d Cir. 1997). The administrative remedy at issue here is the timely filing of a complaint

2

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

with the EEOC.
In a deferral state such as Pennsylvania,3 the time-frame for such a filing is “300
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs.” Bailey v. United Airlines,
279 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Colgan v. Fisher
Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc). “It is well established
that for purposes of filing a charge alleging unlawful discharge, the limitations period
must be measured from the date on which the employee was advised of the decision to
terminate . . . her employment.” Bailey, 279 F.3d at 198.
Here, then, the 300 days would begin to run from the date Baker was
terminated—March 16, 2001. Baker contends, however, that she timely notified the
PHRC of her claim, thereby rendering the subsequent filing with the EEOC timely. She
argues as well that a material question of fact exists as to when the last date of the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred because of her claimed callback rights and the
effect of a general release provided her by Office Depot. Either one, she contends, may
have extended the date past the date she was terminated, making her January 16, 2002
filing with the EEOC timely.
We disagree. Although, in theory, it is possible to render an EEOC claim timely

3

A deferral state is a state that has “an agency authorized to grant relief for federally
prohibited employment discrimination.” Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851,
854 (3d Cir. 2000). The Pennsylvania agency with this authority is the PHRC. See 43 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 959 (as amended 2004).
4

by timely filing with a state employment agency, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (a)(4)(ii)
(1997), Baker has presented no evidence that she filed with the PHRC and, indeed,
concedes that a complaint was “inadvertently not filed.” Appellant’s Br. at 2.
Inconsistent with this concession, she makes various references in her brief to “Exhibit
A” as proof that such a filing or the equivalent thereof occurred; however, we see no such
“Exhibit A.” Baker apparently did submit an “Exhibit A” with her brief in opposition to
Office Depot’s motion for summary judgment, but all that exhibit seems to have been was
PHRC’s instructions on how to file a claim and some forms. This sole communication,
even if we had it before us, which we do not, would not show “specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Neither has Baker come forward with evidence of callback rights.4 Rather, she
argues that “only discovery could hash out” whether in fact there is such evidence.
Appellant’s Br. at 4. But on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

4

Callback rights are more commonly known as reinstatement rights, and are most
typically at issue in labor cases involving unions and union members. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1972). For non-union workers, reinstatement rights
may be provided by an employer as part of an employment contract or termination
agreement, may be conferred by statute, or may be sought as a post-termination remedy.
See, e.g., Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing the New York
statutory scheme for reinstatement rights of state employees); Burkart v. Post-Browning,
Inc., 859 F.2d 1245, 1247 (6th Cir. 1988) (addressing Congress’ grant of reinstatement
rights to military reservists); Moskerc v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8326,
24 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (determining whether plaintiff’s employment contract guaranteed him
reinstatement rights) Garrett v. Matthews, 474 F. Supp. 594, 598 (N.D. Ala. 1979)
(explaining why plaintiff was not entitled to reinstatement after his dismissal).
5

point to facts that already exist in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
admissions. See Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324. Baker has failed to do so.
Baker’s argument that the general release Office Depot offered her could
constitute “continuing discrimination” is equally unpersuasive. As described by the
District Court (because, although called “Exhibit C,” it, too, is not provided), the general
release did no more than explain the conditions upon which severance pay would be
granted. The release did give Baker forty-five days in which to consider the provisions
and decide whether to accept them, and it appears that these forty-five days are what
Baker points to as the period of “continuing discrimination.”
But there is no “continuing discrimination” or “continuing violation where the
effects of prior discriminatory acts, but no actual discrimination, occurred within the
limitations period.” Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, if
Baker’s termination was indeed discriminatory, then the conditions of termination set
forth in the general release were merely the effects of that prior, allegedly unlawful,
employment act. Moreover, Baker has not even alleged that she was discriminatorily
deprived of any rights during the additional forty-five day period.
In the alternative, Baker argues that the 300-day time period should have been
equitably tolled because of counsel’s “inadvertence.” Because this time period is
analogous to a statute of limitations, it is subject to equitable tolling. See Oshiver v.
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994). As relevant here,

6

in order for Baker to have taken advantage of this doctrine, she was required to show that
“[she was] prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable
circumstances.” See Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999). 5
The inequity or mistake Baker points to is the “inadvertence of her counsel,” who
thought he had filed with the PHRC, when, in fact, he had not done so. But for an
attorney’s mistake or misconduct to constitute grounds for equitable tolling, it must be
shown that the attorney’s mistake or misconduct was more than “garden variety neglect.”
Id. at 241; see also Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). For
example, in Seitzinger we held that tolling was appropriate because, unlike here, the
evidence disclosed that the attorney had affirmatively lied to his client and because Ms.
Seitzinger was “extremely diligent in pursuing her claim.” Seitzinger, 165 F.3d at 241.
Mere “inadvertence” is simply not enough, and Baker is subject to the usual rule that
attorney errors will be attributed to the client. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S.
241, 252 (1985). We, thus, reject Baker’s contention that the doctrine of equitable tolling
should have been applied.

5

The Supreme Court has delineated three other circumstances in which it considers
equitable tolling appropriate. They are: (1) when a claimant did not receive adequate
notice of her right to sue; (2) when there is a pending motion for appointed counsel; and
(3) when the court misrepresents to the plaintiff that she has satisfied the requirements of
bringing her suit. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151
(1984).
7

III.
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the June 11, 2003 order of the District
Court.

